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DISENTANGLING DISCRIMINATION ON SPANISH BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to find evidence of discrimination behind 
the scarce presence women on Spanish boards of directors through factors within firms 
linked with different theories of discrimination. 
Research findings/Insights: Using data on the boards of directors from the top 1000 
Spanish companies in 2005 and 2008, we identify some signals of discrimination. We 
find that women directors are scarcer in those sectors where there are less female 
managers or where the directors are mainly draw on the firm’s executive staff. There is 
also evidence of the dynamics of Becker’s theory of discrimination, since time and 
competition seem to play in favour of women’s presence on Spanish boards. We also 
find a contagion effect, implying a positive relationship between the number of women 
already on the board and the likelihood of adding a woman. This could signal some kind 
of underestimation of women’s skills and preconceptions about their attitudes (such as 
risk-aversion) and hence their capacity to hold these positions. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical support for the 
prediction of Becker’s theory of discrimination. The study also furnishes evidence in 
favour of the existence of false preconceptions concerning the skills and risk attitudes of 
female managers. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: In order to reduce discrimination before reaching the 
board we propose to implement education and mentoring initiatives to improve the 
training of the female candidates, to improve the work- and family-life balance. Once 
they are included in the pool of candidates the implementation of good corporate 
governance practices related to transparency and objectivity in selection procedures 
and/or even the establishment of a women’s quota on boards may contribute to dismiss 
employers’ negative beliefs about the capabilities of female candidates. 
 
Key words: Corporate governance; Gender Discrimination; Board of Directors; Glass 
Ceiling. 
Classification JEL: G34, J16, M14, C35.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to find evidence of gender discrimination on the boards of 
directors of the largest Spanish companies through the analysis of observable factors 
related to their presence on boards and their possible relationship with the different 
types of discrimination provided by the literature. To do this, we analyse the 
composition (both in 2005 and 2008) in terms of gender of the boards of directors of the 
top 1,000 Spanish companies, where we have found a percentage of women that ranges 
from 6.6% to 8.6%.When seeking to identify possible causes of female under-
representation, we opt to study determinants on the demand rather than the supply side. 
Supply-side determinants relate to the tendency of women to participate less in the 
labour market and to their relative lack of long-term career commitment when compared 
with men, mainly as a consequence of motherhood, child care and the unequal 
allocation of household tasks. In looking for these kinds of causes, survey data, such as 
that of Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2009) are a useful reference. However, survey data 
are likely to be biased by the self-selection of those women who wish to ‘showcase’ 
their successful careers1. Besides, once a woman has reached the top executive rank, it 
is reasonable to assume that such supply-side differences are minimised and that such 
men and women are likely to be similar, sharing a high level of job motivation and lofty 
career ambitions (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). Hence, additional causes on the demand 
side should be explored. 
The study of gender discrimination on the boards of directors of Spanish 
companies is important for a variety of reasons. Firstly, in today’s corporate world, 
gender diversity has become a relevant topic at a time when a number of market 
regulators are considering quotas for women on publicly traded companies’ boards as a 
requirement in their Codes of Conduct, and when improving governance is a key issue 
for firms to survive in a global crisis. In Spain this is a hot issue since the government, 
by introducing in 2007 the ‘Equality Law’ (Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March 2007 
for Effective Equality between Women and Men), has undertaken to raise female 
representation on publicly traded companies’ boards to 40 per cent by 2015, although 
this female quota is not mandatory but merely a recommendation. Secondly, the study 
of women’s representation on boards is especially interesting as an extreme case in the 
broad research of possible causes of discrimination against women in the labour market. 
In fact, many studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2004; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Farrell & Hersch, 2005) have addressed the differences in gender and race compositions 
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of boards of directors. Terjesen, Sealy and Singh (2009) offer a thorough review of the 
literature on women on corporate boards. And finally, the causes of discrimination in 
labour markets remain an open issue, where no clear evidence has been found to favour 
one theory over another. Indeed, the characteristics of the different types of 
discrimination are usually mixed and distorted by elements of segregation (vertical and 
horizontal) in the labour market. In view of this, the key is to identify the type of 
discrimination that occurs in the labour market since different kinds of discrimination 
have different economic implications and imply diverse policy actions for 
policymakers. 
The Spanish case offers a suitable setting for distinguishing among different 
causes of discrimination. In the Spanish business environment, women’s economic 
integration remains a cause for concern given the marked lack of women in the higher 
decision-making positions (de Anca, 2008). While data from the quarterly survey of the 
labour market conducted by the Spanish national statistics office show that women’s 
participation in the Spanish labour market has steadily increased from 28% in 1976 to 
44% in 2009, the same increase is not observed in directorships and, especially, on 
boards of directors. According to the World Economic Forum 2009 Gender Gap report 
(Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2009), Spain ranks 90th out of 134 countries in terms of 
Economic Participation and Opportunity and 120th in terms of wage equality. In this 
sense, according to the Spanish Women’s Institute’s 2006 data, while the participation 
of women in executive positions of companies and the public sector is around 32%, it is 
only between 6% and 8% on the boards of directors of the largest Spanish companies in 
2005 and 2008, respectively, according to our estimates (see Table 1 for previous 
reports on women’s presence on Spanish boards of directors). This proportion is one of 
the lowest among developed countries. In fact, Terjesen and Singh (2008) shows that 
Spain has the 8th lowest percentage of women on boards among 43 countries studied, 
ahead only of Japan, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, Ireland, Austria and Argentina. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Nevertheless, the disadvantageous economic position of women in Spain does 
not equate to that exhibited in other social realms. In this respect, the WEF report shows 
that Spain ranks 9th regarding political empowerment (6th for women in ministerial 
positions with 44% female representation, and 11th in women in parliament with 36% of 
female members), and in terms of education it occupies first position for level of 
enrolment in secondary and tertiary education (96% and 76% of all women 
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respectively). Therefore, there may be something in the economic area of Spanish 
society explaining this disparity. 
Several theories explain this under-representation of women in the corporate 
world, based on adverse selection (women’s incentive problems in the labour market) 
leading to self-fulfilling prophecies about their professional development. Moreover, De 
la Rica, Dolado, and Llorens (2008) find evidence that discrimination against women 
plays a key role in the Spanish labour market when explaining differences across 
gender, despite the fact that men and women are ex-ante identical. Given that outcome, 
we focus our study on the possible presence of a ‘glass ceiling’2 (Morrison, White, & 
Van Velsor, 1987; Powell & Butterfield, 1994) as a crucial factor behind the scant 
presence of women on Spanish corporate boards.  
We contribute to the literature on gender discrimination on Boards of Directors 
in several respects. Firstly, when looking for signals of discrimination on Spanish 
boards of directors we try to disentangle the mechanisms through which this might be 
taking place resorting to alternative theoretical models. In this sense, we take a step 
forward from similar studies by going into a level of detail which, to the best of our 
knowledge, no other study has achieved. Secondly, we control for a wider range of 
explanatory variables than the extant literature, which concentrates almost exclusively 
on visually observable firm characteristics. In this sense, we include variables that add 
features of the firm’s industrial sector, such as industry competition (the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index) and the proportion of female directors in an industry, along with a 
variable to control for the exogenous shock caused by the introduction in 2007 of the 
‘Equality Law’. And finally, unlike previous studies which mainly focus on Spanish 
listed companies or on a small sample of the largest Spanish companies, we focus on 
the top 1000 Spanish companies using similar criteria to those of  the countries that 
usually monitor diversity on boards as an indicator of good corporate governance. The 
result of this is a database of unparalleled size and extensive scope in Spain (Catalyst  
gathers large scale data on women on boards in its Annual Census of the Fortune 500, 
but from US firms) that comprises more than 6000 board members in 2005 and around 
5300 in 2008, with information collected from different sources (the SABI database, the 
files from the Mercantile Registry, e-Informa database, companies’ annual reports and 
websites). This comprehensive database has allowed us to expand the number and the 
types of companies compared with previous studies and to estimate, through discrete 
outcome models, the probability of a directorship being held by a woman. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the 
theoretical models of discrimination and develop our hypothesis drawing on these 
theories. We then describe the data and the methodology of sample selection, and define 
the independent variables used. In the following section, discrete outcome models 
(negative binomial regression models) are used to estimate the probability of a director 
being a woman along with two additional models to gain further evidence for Becker’s 
predictions and the contagion effect. Finally, we discuss the results obtained and present 
the main limitations and future research lines. 
 
THEORETICAL MODELS OF DISCRIMINATIONAND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
In corporate governance, the concept of diversity relates to board composition and 
refers to the mix of attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by individual 
board members in relation to board procedures and decision-making (Van der Walt & 
Ingley, 2003). In the widest sense, the various types of diversity in the boardroom 
include gender, age, ethnicity, race, nationality, culture, religion, constituency 
representation, independence, professional background, knowledge, technical skills and 
expertise, commercial and industry experience, and career and life experience (Milliken 
& Martins, 1996; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Point & Singh, 2003; 
Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). In this paper we focus on the first of these.  
Progress towards more diversified boards in terms of gender has been slow and 
efforts to diversify boards away from homogeneous, closed and elitist cultures have 
encountered many difficulties. Many explanations may lie behind the low representation 
of women on boards of directors. In the first place, there may be a limited proportion of 
women with the professional profile desired by the company to join the board and 
therefore, they are generally excluded from the pool of potential executive candidates to 
hold these positions. Generally, candidates to the board of directors are required to have, 
among other prerequisites, a high level of previous experience in positions of 
responsibility in departments such as production and finance, whereas the heads of 
departments in other areas, like human resources or marketing, where there is a greater 
presence of women, are not considered to the same degree as potential candidates to 
hold directorships. 
The second explanation is discrimination due to preferences. In this sense, the 
company may discard female candidates for its board of directors even when they are 
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available because the decision-makers prefer forfeiting income rather than hiring 
women (Becker, 1957). The third explanation for the scarce presence of women on 
boards is due to the fact that the abilities of women candidates are not correctly 
assessed. This includes statistical discrimination defined by Phelps (1972) that occurs 
when women are judged according to the average characteristics of their group and not 
on the basis of their own personal characteristics; and also the closely related mistake-
based discrimination with respect to the systematic underestimation of women’s skills 
(Wolfers, 2006). 
The reduced pool of female candidates limits their presence on the board. 
Regarding the first group of explanations, which we call ‘reduced pool of female 
executive candidates’, the limited presence of women on boards of directors would not 
be due so much to gender discrimination in the selection process as to the existence of 
socio-cultural obstacles in the early stages leading up to the professional promotion of 
women. Nevertheless, even in a context without discrimination, it is an empirical (and 
unresolved) question whether this is efficient or not. In fact, some authors (Rodríguez 
Mora, 2009) argue that, even if there were no discrimination, an outcome where female 
participation is scarce would be inefficient insofar as the preferences and outlook on life 
that women have are a consequence of ‘nurture’ (they are brought up in certain ways) 
and not ‘nature’, that is, because of their inherent condition of being women. 
Among the factors that explain why there are fewer women than men with the 
potential to be appointed to boards of directors, there are some explanations, such as the 
existence of occupational segregation (Dolado, Felgueroso, & Jimeno, 2004), which 
reduce the proportion of women in finance-related or more technical positions, which 
are precisely those functions more likely to be represented on a corporate board. 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) state that there are differences between men and women 
that could prevent the development of a successful executive career, such as women’s 
relative lack of long-term career commitment possibly induced by lower wages, or a 
greater taste for fringe benefits or good working conditions, family responsibilities that, 
in many cases, unlike with men, interrupt the development of the professional activity 
of the female worker, or the anticipation by many women of the glass ceiling that drives 
them to sacrifice their professional development in favour of their family life (according 
to data from Spanish Woman’s Institute, in 2006 Q4, among the people who were not 
seeking employment due to family reasons, 97% were women, with women also 
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requesting leave in 98% of cases of maternity/paternity leaves). All of them mean that 
there is a lower proportion of ready-for-the-board female executives. 
If there is a shortage of suitable-prepared female executives, we would expect to 
find a lower proportion of female directors among those economic sectors where there 
is a lower supply of female managers.  
Hypothesis 1.1: There is a positive relationship between the industry proportion 
of female executives and the proportion of women on the board. 
Additionally, the special characteristics of the pool where the companies chose 
board members are important when determining the effect of the reduced pool of 
women candidates on the percentage of women on the board. So, in those firms where 
the board members are filled mainly among the owners of the firm do not apply the 
restriction of a reduced pool of women in the executive management. This is the case of 
family-based firms, where the pool of candidates for the board comes from family ties 
and where women board members assume at the same time their roles as managers and 
as owners. In this sense, insofar as in family-based firms female executive candidates to 
the board are drawing on the owners-managers women family members females find a 
easier access to the board and we should expect a greater presence of women on their 
boards compared to the rest of companies. Ruigrock, Peck, and Tacheva (2007) found 
that in Swiss family-based companies in which women with family ties were more 
likely to have access to boards and where the owners have a greater control of the 
company and managers are less likely to be on the board, female directors will make up 
a higher proportion of the board.  
Hypothesis 1.2.: Family-based firm variable has a positive relationship with the 
proportion of women directors. 
Lack of competition hinders the presence of women on the board. The 
reduced pool of female candidates could imply that the number of women who are 
actually willing and able to hold a position on boards of directors is not equal to that of 
men. Nevertheless, considering that the population of female executives (31.7% 
according to the Spanish Woman’s Institute 2006 data) is a good proxy of directors’ 
eligibility, a proportion higher than the actual 6-8% should be expected for women’s 
presence on boards. Therefore, the significant gap between these figures points to the 
possibility of some kind of discrimination against women. 
We label the first group of discrimination drivers as ‘discrimination for 
preferences’. According to Becker’s theory of discrimination (Becker, 1957), we refer 
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to cases where those responsible for appointing board members have a dislike for 
female directors, sacrificing efficiency in order to select people they “like” instead of 
people they “need”. Thus, the Becker theory predicts that the discriminatory practices 
(what he called taste-based discrimination) of those companies that prefer not to work 
with women would lead to higher costs, in terms of loss of efficiency and lower profits, 
than those of companies that did not discriminate. Consequently, in a perfectly 
competitive market, the companies that discriminated would not survive in the long 
term. 
The usual criticism of Becker’s theory focuses on the point that discrimination, 
implying higher costs or diminished income, should have disappeared as a result of 
market dynamics, since time and competition would ultimately resolve the problem of 
discrimination in the long run. In spite of this, Heckman (1998) argues that this 
prediction may not be false in the end. According to this author, discrimination will 
only disappear in the presence of strong competition and even then it may take decades 
to remove inefficient companies (such as those that discriminate) from the market. In 
less competitive markets, extra rents allow companies to indulge their tastes, and 
therefore discrimination can be seen as an affordable option for those who like it even 
when this is uneconomical. Cavalluzo, Cavalluzo, and Wolken (2002) found that 
African Americans were more likely to be denied credit in less competitive financial 
markets (those more concentrated). Thus, in our empirical study we look for signs of 
lower numbers of female directors among less competitive sectors. Using the level of 
industry concentration as an inverse indicator of competition we can formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.1. An industry’s level of competitive concentration has a negative 
relationship with the percentage of women on the board 
Additionally, according to Heckman’s (1988) proposition, market dynamics will 
take some time to work through before removing a new company with discriminating 
practices from the market. Indeed, among start-ups one could find all type of 
companies, discriminating, and non-discriminating ones. Those less inefficient 
companies have higher chances of surviving. As long as we consider discriminating 
practices as inefficient, we expect a lower presence of women among younger 
companies and a higher proportion of women on boards among older ones, because 
only in older companies the detrimental effect of discrimination would have reduced 
their chances of survival and only the non-discriminating ones remain in the market. 
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Hypothesis 2.2. The firm’s age has a positive relationship with the proportion of 
women directors. 
Lack of information about actual personal abilities raises barriers against 
female candidates. Sometimes, the absence of female directors does not stem from an 
act of deliberate discrimination or preference for male directors, but as a consequence of 
an underestimation of women’s skills. This underestimation is linked with diverse 
theories of discrimination. For instance, according to statistical discrimination (Phelps, 
1972), the company that seeks to maximise its expected profit will discriminate against 
women if it believes them to be less qualified on average than men, or if the cost of 
gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive. Thus, the company 
will look for easily observable variables (i.e. gender), instead of personal characteristics, 
which may reflect biased inferences on the part of the company and have nothing to do 
with productivity or information. Although there may be some economic rationality to 
this, inefficiencies can also be involved, as the a priori preference for male over female 
candidates might not only stem from the employer’s previous statistical experience with 
the two groups, but also from the prevailing sociological beliefs concerning the abilities 
of women and from prejudices about them in society. 
Closely related to this is mistake-based discrimination. Biased knowledge about 
female candidates has its roots in stereotyped profiles of men and women that have no 
real and objective basis. Therefore, if the low representation of women on the board 
were caused by this type of discrimination, the companies involved would be inefficient 
in their resource allocation, entailing a clear cost for them. We, therefore conclude that, 
given an underestimation of women’s skills, in those cases where board nomination 
committees have some additional information about candidates, women’s presence is 
substantially higher. This information prevents women from being assessed in terms of 
some kind of average of a female group or stereotype. 
If there are stereotypes and social prejudices that bias the perception of women’s 
abilities, this bias tends to disappear if more women are already on the board, since 
direct contact with people of the discriminated group, and the information provided by 
this, can offset the effects of social stereotypes and prejudices (Bertrand, Dolly, & 
Mullainathan, 2005). According to this contagion factor, we are more likely to observe 
the addition of a woman to the board the higher the previous existing representation of 
women on the board. 
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Hypothesis 3.1. The absence of women on the board has a negative relationship 
with the probability of hiring new female candidates. 
One example of this underestimation of women’s skills that can be easily tested 
is to look at risk-aversion. The perception that women are more risk-averse than men 
(Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998) is considered by some authors 
as a stereotype and as a major cause of the ‘glass ceiling’ on corporate promotion 
ladders (Johnson & Powell, 1994). In this sense, Schubert, Brown, Grysler, and 
Brachinger (1999) found that, in contextual financial decisions, the preconceptions 
concerning the risk attitudes of female investors and managers may be more prejudice 
than fact, and they would be a source of statistical discrimination against women in 
financial and labour markets. The lower presence of women on the boards of firms 
engaged in riskier business can also be seen as a sign of statistical discrimination in the 
sense that, if women are expected to be more conservative investors than men, they are 
consequently excluded from those positions more concerned with risk-taking. This 
discrimination means that when a company faces a significant level of risk, it is less 
likely to hire women for the board, since they are wrongly seen as less skilled to make 
the risky decisions that may be necessary for a firm’s success. To test whether risk-
aversion is a true stereotype, we expect the level of risk only to affect the hiring of new 
female directors in those companies with no woman on the board. By contrast, once 
women are on the board and their risk propensity can be correctly assessed by the whole 
board, there should be no effect of the level of risk on the gender of new board 
members. 
Hypothesis 3.2. The risk level of the firm has no effect on the gender of new 
directors when there are already women on the board. 
To sum up, Table 2 presents and summarizes all of the propositions and the 
hypotheses of our study and their relationship with the various theories of 
discrimination 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data Selection 
In Spain, the board of directors is the chief governing body of a company, and it is 
appointed by the shareholders’ meeting. The company’s bylaws specify the composition 
and number of members of the board and how they are to be chosen. However, article 
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116 of the Securities Market Law obliges Spanish listed companies to inform in their 
Annual Report on Corporate Governance on compliance with the official 
recommendations concerning corporate governance. According to this article, when 
dealing with aspects related to board practice and standards, Spanish corporations 
follow the ‘comply or explain principle’ (De Anca, 2008). 
These recommendations were established in the Unified Code of Good 
Corporate Governance of Listed Companies approved by the CNMV (National 
Securities Markets Commission, the Spanish equivalent to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission), in May 2006. This Code sets out recommendations concerning 
functional structure, size and board composition. The board should reflect the diversity 
of knowledge, gender and experience needed to perform its functions effectively, 
objectively and independently. For that reason, the board should ideally comprise no 
fewer than five and no more than 15 members; External directors (non-executive 
directors) - both proprietary and independent - should hold a large majority of board 
places. In particular, independent directors should account for at least one-third of all 
board members; Gender diversity has been introduced into the new code in 
Recommendation n.15 whereby when the number of female directors is low or zero, the 
board must explain the reasons and actions taken to correct the situation. 
With reference to this gender diversity, the Code recommends that companies 
with a limited presence of women on their Boards should make a deliberate effort to 
find potential female candidates whenever a vacancy has to be filled (especially that of 
independent directors). In particular, the Nomination Committee must ensure that in the 
process of selecting new board members: a) there are no implicit biases preventing or 
impeding the selection of women; and b) companies will have to look intentionally for 
and include among potential candidates women with the professional profile sought. 
The Code also specifies more specialized procedures for the selection of new board 
members. Although the CNMV considers there have been significant improvements in 
corporate governance at listed Spanish companies, it also underlines the need to have 
better board transparency, in particular in the selection processes. 
The present study focuses on Spanish companies whose operating revenues 
exceeded 100 million euros in the year 2003, according to the SABI3 database. This 
includes both listed and unlisted companies. We have chosen to analyse the largest 
companies because they mark a clear business and social reference. Small and medium-
sized enterprises behave quite differently in terms of their corporate governance (Zahra, 
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Neubaum & Huse, 2000; Link, Netter & Yang, 2008) and the quality of information 
deteriorates quite sharply when the size of the company analyzed shrinks. Additionally, 
the firm size criterion corresponds to those used in other countries that usually monitor 
diversity on boards as an indicator of good corporate governance, which makes for 
readier comparison with neighbouring countries. Also, this is the criterion of the 
economic literature for analysing diversity on boards. For example, Carter et al. (2003) 
use Fortune 1000 companies as their sample, while Farrell and Hersch (2005) base their 
study on Fortune 500 lists, as do Adams and Ferreira (2004).The search showed a total 
of 1148 non-financial companies, once companies that had closed down4 had been 
eliminated. In 2003 these companies had a total of 1.35 million employees, representing 
10% of the total Spanish workforce. They also accounted for 65% of the companies 
with more than 5,000 employees, 40% of those with more than 1,000 and 30% of those 
with more than 500. Their aggregate operating revenue was equivalent to 65% of GDP 
and accounted for 78% of the returns of Spanish companies. 
Information on the board members of companies was also obtained from the 
SABI database5, as updated in June 2005 and June 2008. This interval of three years is 
the same used by Garay and Gonzalez (2008), to ensure mobility of the board members. 
In some cases, it was necessary to supplement that data with information obtained from 
files from the Mercantile Registry, e-Informa database, and companies’ annual reports 
and websites. 
In order to determine the gender composition of the boards, we examine the first 
names of the board members. Spanish first names clearly identify gender, even for those 
names with the same root they have a different suffix (i.e. Antonio for male, Antonia for 
female). And in the case of composite names, the order signals the gender (i.e. María-
José for female and José-María for male). Therefore, the gender of almost all directors 
was clearly signalled by their first names. For those remaining (mainly foreign –e.g. 
Japanese, Korean, French and Scandinavian - names), the matter was clarified one-by-
one using internet search: by the use of gender-specific language in a biography given in 
the Annual Report (Mr, Ms, he, she, his, her, etc); by a photograph given in the Annual 
Report; by internet materials (mainly news articles and the websites of foreign 
companies). Institutional board seats held by other corporations are excluded, since they 
are represented by a changing group of individuals whose identities and gender are 
unknown. Thus, to measure the number of female board members, only individual 
direct members were counted. There were only 633 institutionally held board positions 
Page 12 of 42
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
13 
 
in 2005 out of 6,636 (9.54%) and 675 in 2008 out of 5,952 (11.34%) in the top 1148 
companies. Additionally, under the hypothesis that the percentage of women among the 
total of individual direct members is, or should be, approximately the same as that 
found among the total administrators, it should not produce significant biases to exclude 
institutional board seats in the calculated percentage of female participation on boards. 
Therefore, the exclusion of these seats from this study has a relatively small impact on 
the proportion of women on the boards of directors of these companies – 63 companies 
were excluded for 2005, since all their boards were filled with institutionally designated 
directors. That left 1,085 companies suitable for the following analysis of gender 
composition. In 2008, 1076 companies out of the original sample of 1148 non-financial 
companies were still in existence (67 had liquidated, another four were in a liquidation 
process, and one had disappeared from the original sample because it was a joint 
venture that had been dissolved), and there were 84 companies whose boards were 
entirely made up of institutional board members, reducing the final sample to a total of 
992 firms. 
In addition, the functions of Commissioner (comisario), Manager/Administrator, 
General Manager and Secretary of the Board were eliminated from the sample of 
directors since these, as a general rule, do not qualify as board members when identified 
by SABI. The study regards as board members the functions of President, Vice-
President, Executive Director, Administrator, Joint Administrator (Member of the 
Board), Sole Administrator and other functions (such as the Treasurer and those on the 
governing boards of three cooperative companies: COFARES, COREM and 
ANCOOP). With reference to those companies in which a sole administrator represents 
the board of directors, in the absence of a complete board, these companies are counted 
as having a board formed by a single individual within the set of board directors 
represented in this study. 
With regard to the characteristics of the boards of directors (Table 3), we 
conclude that, in June 2005, just 6.61% (397) of individual board directorships of the 
6003 in the top 1085 Spanish companies were held by women. The average number of 
direct members per board was 5.53, of which only 0.37 were women, and only 255 
companies (23.5%) included at least one woman on their boards. Referring to the 
figures for June 2008, there has been a slight increase in the diversity of Spanish boards, 
since now 8.66% (457) of the 5277 individual seats on the boards of directors in the top 
992 Spanish companies are held by women. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Between 2005 and 2008, 1,893 directors were appointed, 196 of them women 
(10.35%). In the same period, 2,619 directors left boards, with just 5.19% (136) of them 
female directors. This indicates that 56.4% of all the directors in the 2005 sample 
remained in their position in 2008, but for female directors there was a higher retention 
rate, at 65.7%). We use these data to analyze hypothesis 3 in the following section. 
Defining Independent Variables 
We identify various firm characteristics as independent variables in our models since 
previous research documents relationships between the representation of women on 
corporate boards and specific firm characteristics (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). We use 
measures of board size, firm size, degree of independence with regard to shareholders, 
firm age, profitability, productivity by employee, firm risk, indebtedness ratio, public 
contracts, competition in the industry and its proportion of female directors. 
Additionally, we include the following variables: the cooperative association form of 
the company; if the firm is stock market-listed; its family-based character; and industry 
control dummies. Descriptive statistics concerning these variables are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The availability of financial variables (profitability, productivity, risk and 
indebtedness, as well as firm size) depends on the existence of a firm’s financial 
statements, which in some cases (unlisted companies) are available to the public only 
with considerable delay. Therefore we lag these variables a minimum of two years to 
ensure we have data for all the firms in the sample. This lag has the added advantage of 
reducing the risk of possible endogeneity between these variables and female 
representation (Carter D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Garay & González, 2008). 
In this way, we speak about causality in Granger’s sense in such a way that financial 
variables produce the distinct proportion of women on boards of directors, and not vice 
versa. Additionally, firm effects and year dummies will help to reduce any bias on 
omitted variables (Carter D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). 
Board size is measured by the number of individual direct members on the 
board. We have also included the square of this variable to take into account possible 
non- linearities. There are multiple ways of defining firm size. The most common 
quantitative criteria to measure it are: number of employees, total assets and net income 
(Osteryoung & Newman, 1993). We choose total assets, since this measure is an 
established way of accounting for differences in firm size and has been used in previous 
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board-related studies (Agrawal & Knowber, 2001; Carter et al., 2003). In order to avoid 
unusual results in one year distorting the measure, we calculate a two-year lagged three-
year mean. 
Shareholder control in the company is measured by the Bureau van Dijk’s 
Independence Indicator, which construct an indicator through its Database of 
Ownership to measure the degree of independence of the company in relation to its 
shareholders. The indicator is constructed as follows: the A indicator denotes the 
maximum degree of independence and is assigned when there are no shareholders 
registered with direct or complete ownership equal to or higher than 25% of the capital. 
It is also divided into A+, A or A- based on the criteria that the higher the number of 
shareholders, the more difficult the control of a company. The B indicator is applied to 
companies in which none of the registered shareholders possesses 50% or more (direct 
or total) of the company’s equity; again, this is classified as B+, B or B- depending on 
the identified number of shareholders. The C indicator is applied to a company with a 
registered shareholder who has more than 49.99% (direct or total), and also if a source 
indicates that there is a final ownership. Lastly, the indicator U shows an unknown 
degree of independence. We categorize this variable using values from 1 to 6, where 1 
indicates the lowest grade of independence (C) and 6 the highest (A+). 
Another variable used to characterize different attitudes toward the presence of 
women on boards of directors is the firm’s age. To the best of our knowledge, while the 
relationship between time and discrimination is straightforwardly determined from the 
studies of Becker (1957) and Heckman (1998), no other paper has empirically analyzed 
this linkage. The firm’s age is introduced into the model in logarithms because the main 
differences are expected in the early years of the company. 
We select two ratios to measure firm performance: profitability, measured using 
the two-year lagged mean of the return on assets (ROA) over three consecutive years, 
computed as net income divided by total assets; and the three-year mean of productivity 
per employee, calculated as the ratio of operating revenues (in thousands of euros) per 
employee lagged two years. 
We also include a measure of leverage: the first is the three-year average of the 
firm’s indebtedness ratio lagged two years, computed as the long-term debts of the 
company divided by the share capital plus reserves. Furthermore, we study the level of 
risk, as the volatility of profitability, measured by the standard deviation of the annual 
ROA computed over a two-year lagged 13-year period. 
Page 15 of 42
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
16 
 
Additionally, we include the variable ‘public contracts’ to control for the 
exogenous shock caused by the introduction in 2007 of the Act for Effective Equality 
between Women and Men (Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March 2007) by the Spanish 
government. This statute, in order to encourage the inclusion of women on company 
boards, provides that the government may give special priority when giving public 
contracts to those firms that promote labour market equality between women and men. 
To take into account the possible impact of this Act on those firms that undertake 
government contracts, we add the percentage accounted for by government contracts in 
total income between 2004 and 2006 as a new variable. If companies heed this statute, 
when government contracts represent a sizeable percentage of a firm’s total income, 
then it may be more likely to have more women on its board. 
We also include two variables that add features of the firm industry. One is 
competition. To compute this variable we have used the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(HHI) at industry level. The HHI measures industry concentration and it is a widely 
accepted measure of industry competition (Rhoades, 1993) as it decreases as industry 
competition increases. The HHI index is calculated as the sum of the squared market 
shares as a percentage of all firms in an industry (2-digit CNAE, Spanish equivalent of 
SIC codes) for 2003. We transform the variable to its natural logarithmic to avoid 
skewness. The second variable is the proportion of female directors in an industry (2-
digit CNAE), obtained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey for 2003. 
We include three dummy variables in the models: family-based firm, listed 
company (quoted on a stock market) and cooperative association form since among the 
companies studied, the representation of women on the governing bodies of cooperative 
companies is greater than in any other type of company (i.e., public limited companies 
and limited liability companies). In the case of the family-based firm variable, we use 
the dimensions of ownership and power as a classification criterion (Gersik, Davis, 
Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Thus, a company is considered a family-based firm when 
various members (at least two) of the same family hold seats on the board of directors 
and/or a significant portion of the shares of the company are owned by the same 
family.6 When a company is a subsidiary or is part of a family group, but no member of 
the family is on its board of directors, this company is not classified as a family-based 
firm since the family is not directly involved in its management. To verify the family 
nature of the companies in the sample analysed, we have the help of the Instituto de la 
Empresa Familiar (Family Business Institute), which checked our list against its 
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confidential database of member companies to find possible errors or omissions. The 
final inventory offers a total of 244 family-based firms, representing 22.5% of the 
studied sample (1085 companies). 
Finally, in order to take into account possible differences between industries, we 
combine the companies into industry classifications used by the Spanish Stock Markets 
(Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME)), and we include industry fixed effects based on 
these classifications7. In table 5 we show a correlation matrix for all the variables used 
in this section. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
MODELLING WOMEN’S PRESENCE ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
The number of female directors on the board of a company (yi) can be modelled with a 
count data model. In the present case, where the variance of the dependent variable (the 
number of female directors) is higher than the mean, we estimate a negative binomial 
regression model (equation 1)8. In this model the probability of finding k women on the 
board of directors of a company is given by equation 1, 
[ ]
( )
ie
k
ky
k
i
i
νλνλ −
==
!
Pr          (1) 
This model is a generalisation of a Poisson regression model that adds a random 
variable (ν ) with a Gamma distribution of parameters α1  and α  
( ( ) ~νg Gamma ( )αα ,1 ) to account for the extra variability of the distribution. As in a 
Poisson distribution, iλ  is the expected number of female directors on the board of 
company i ( [ ] iiyE λ= ). The expectations of the dependent variable vary mainly with 
the size of the board ( in ) that is considered as the exposure variable. Therefore, the 
expected number of female directors can be modelled (Equation 2) as the product of the 
number of directors ( in ) and the proportion of women among them (pi). This latter 
variable (pi) can vary in accordance with a group of independent variables ( iX ), 
referred to the whole company. 
βX ienpn iiii ==λ          (2) 
In this negative binomial model, parameter α  allows us to quantify the grade of 
over-dispersion of variable yi (the greater α  is, the greater the variance will be with 
respect to the mean). In this way, if α  = 0, the negative binomial becomes a Poisson 
distribution (equal mean and variance). However, if 0≠α , then there is a so-called 
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contagion effect, i.e. having a positive case makes it more probable that there will be 
further positive cases. This contagion factor can be derived from the case where the 
gender of each member of the board is not independent of the gender of the other 
members. We make use of this contagion effect as a sign that reinforces hypothesis 3.1, 
the presence of women on the board lessens barriers to other female candidates, 
although further test are presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Robust estimations of the negative binomial regression models are presented in 
Table 69. The number of direct members of the board is used as the exposure factor ( in ) 
in the negative binomial regression models. This implies that, although the independent 
variable is the number of direct members, the outcome of the regression, and the effects 
of the independent variables can be interpreted in terms of the expected proportion of 
female directors ip , instead of the number of female directors iy .  
Moreover, we consider two possible specifications for the model. The first one 
(model I) uses pooled data from 2005 and 2008 to fit a negative binomial model with a 
single over-dispersion parameter common to all companies. The second (model II) uses 
panel data to fit a negative binomial model with a random-effects over-dispersion 
parameter that varies randomly from company to company. The results of both models 
are quite similar, and the tests to measure the goodness of fit, such as the Wald test or 
the likelihood test, show that the estimated models describe reasonably well the 
behaviour of the dependent variable (the proportion of women on boards of directors) 
even at a 1% significance level. 
 
RESULTS 
Regarding the interpretation of the significant explanatory variables in the models, we 
include four groups of variables: the control variables and the variables concerning 
hypotheses. Next we discuss the results for each of these explanatory variables of the 
proportion of women on boards of directors. To clarify the implications of the results, 
we compute the expected proportion of female directors in a case base company where 
variables are considered in their means (quantitative variables) and their modes 
(qualitative variables). 
Beginning with the control variables, the number of direct members of the board 
is used as the exposure factor in the negative binomial regression models, but is added, 
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as well, as an explanatory variable. In the latter role, we observe that it is effectively a 
significant explanatory variable, in which an increase in board size implies an increase 
in the proportion of positions held by women, as documented by Carter et al. (2003) and 
Agrawal and Knowber (2001). The variable is also significant (negatively) in squared 
terms, so an increase in board size only has an effect for small boards, since the effect 
on the proportion of female directors reaches a maximum when the board has around 20 
to 25 members (see Figure 1).  
As prior research suggests (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007; Fryxell & 
Lerner, 1989; Harrigan, 1981), we find that the type of industry is significant in 
explaining the presence of women on corporate boards. Thus it turns out that industries 
with a higher presence of women (Financial services and real estate agencies, Consumer 
goods and Consumer services) are service-oriented, labour-intensive industries, while 
those with a lower presence are the more technical ones such as Oil and energy, 
Commodities, industry and construction, and Technology and telecommunications.  
There was also a significant increase in the number of female directors between 
2005 and 2008. Nevertheless, it is not possible to know whether this implies a tendency 
towards reducing the discrimination gap or just a discrete change. A possible 
explanation for this increase is related to the Equality Law. In this sense, if the Act were 
the main driver in the observed increase, this shift should be higher among companies 
where government contracts represent a sizable percentage of their total income, since it 
lays down that, to retain government contracts, those companies should have (among 
other things) a gender-balanced board by 2015. Nevertheless, the variable that takes it 
into account (the share of public contracts in a company’s income) has not implied a 
greater increase between 2005 and 2008. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
With respect to the influence of the Bureau van Dijk’s Independence Indicator, 
given that in Spain the presence of activism in favour of diversity on the boards of 
directors by institutional shareholders is not detected, as Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach (1998) and Gillan and Starks (2000) document in their studies, we consider a 
more likely cause is the fact that women in Spain tend to hold seats on boards as 
External Proprietary directors. The cooperative variable result can be explained by the 
practice of these companies of having representatives of the partners on the board on the 
basis of a democratic voting procedure (one member, one vote).  
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Additionally, we find a (marginally significant) negative relationship between 
the presence of women on the board of directors and the fact of being a listed company 
(see Table 6), and the firm size variable. By contrast, Agrawal and Knowber (2001) 
found for the US a positive sign that they attribute to a greater demand for diversity 
directed at these companies through public opinion. Usually, these types of companies 
(large and listed) include a smaller proportion of proprietary directors on their boards 
while having a higher proportion of executives and independent directors, where women 
are under-represented. 
Other control variables related to profitability (ROA) and productivity (turnover 
per employee) do not have a significant effect on the representation of women in 
Spanish boards. This result does not coincide with previous studies (Adler, 2001; Carter 
et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2004; Erhardt, Verberl, & Shrader 2003), which found a positive 
relationship between female representation on the board and the company’s 
performance. However, to test this hypothesis, the model specification should be the 
reverse, with profitability as the dependent variable and the gender composition of the 
board as a lagged independent variable as in Carter et al. (2003). 
Regarding Hypothesis 1.1, the proportion of female executives in the industry 
has a positive (and statistically significant) effect on the expected number of female 
directors on the board. This result reinforces the hypothesis that a reduced pool of 
women candidates from executive positions diminishes the number of female members 
of the Board of Directors. 
The results (see Table 6) confirm hypothesis 1.2. Family-based companies, 
where board members are chosen mainly among owners and where the pool of 
candidates stems from family ties and not from executive positions, has a positive 
relationship with the proportion of women directors. In fact, Family-based firm is the 
variable that has the greatest positive impact on the presence of women on boards of 
directors (see Table 6).  
A reduced pool of female candidates is far from being the only explanation of 
the differences between companies in the observed number of female directors. As we 
have previously commented, theoretical arguments focused on the characteristics of the 
female labour supply (which we called the reduced pool of female executive candidates) 
cannot explain, on their own, the sizable gap found in women’s participation in Spanish 
boards of directors. Therefore, when we interpret the sign and effect of the explanatory 
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variables, we turn to the demand side for the role played by the distinct types of 
discrimination against women by linking the identified factors with alternative theories. 
According to Becker’s taste-based discrimination, as discriminating companies 
incur higher economic costs, in perfect competitive markets they tend to disappear. 
Hypothesis 2.1 states that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of 
women on the board and industry competition. The results in Table 7 and Figure 1 show 
that the level of industry concentration, measured by the HHI index, has a negative 
effect on the proportion of female directors. Since this index decreases with industry 
competition, the sign of the estimated coefficient is congruent with hypothesis 2.1 and 
also in line with the dynamics predicted by Becker’s theory, that discrimination is less 
likely in competitive sectors.  
As can be seen in the models of table 6 and figure 1, the age of the firm has a 
positive relationship with the proportion of women on the board (Hypothesis 2.2). This 
also reinforces the idea behind Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination. The fact 
that older companies have more women on their boards seems to indicate precisely that 
companies that survive are those that integrate more diversity into their boards. By 
contrast, among younger ones it is easier to find both discriminating companies and 
those who do not discriminate10. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Hypothesis 3.1 states that the presence of women on the board helps to reduce 
statistical discrimination and other mistake-based discrimination. The estimated 
negative binomial models show that there is a positive and significant contagion effect. 
Likelihood ratio tests also confirm the existence of over-dispersion of the number of 
women on the boards of directors, since the negative binomial model is preferable to the 
simple Poisson regression model. By contrast, a likelihood ratio test against a zero-
inflated negative binomial allows us to conclude that this later model is not better than 
the negative binomial model, and that the contagion factor is able to explain sufficiently 
the observed over-dispersion.  
This significant contagion effect indicates that the presence of women on the 
board lessens barriers to other female candidates. That is to say, if there is a woman on 
the board, it is more likely that other women will be appointed to the same board. So 
far, there are at least three different causes for this contagion factor. The first two are 
hypothesised by Farrel and Hersch (2005). One, on the supply side, is that potential 
female candidates may be more attracted to firms that have already achieved some 
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degree of board diversity. The other reason offered by these authors is on the demand 
side, bearing in mind that women board members may have an influence in hiring 
additional women to serve on the board, either by identifying their peers for nomination 
or by applying pressure. Alternatively, we consider a third explanation (also on the 
demand side) in line with the possible existence of a certain underestimation of 
women’s skills, based on the fact that the previous presence of women on the board 
contributes to reducing the bias in the perception of their abilities (removing mistake-
based discrimination). 
Nevertheless, statistically speaking, an alternative source of the observed over-
dispersion in the negative binomial model is unobserved heterogeneity, derived from 
omitted variables. That is to say, unobserved heterogeneity (‘spurious contagion’) and 
‘true’ contagion can generate the same negative binomial distribution of observed 
outputs. With a non-dynamic model, it is impossible to determine whether the observed 
over-dispersed distribution arose from true or spurious contagion (Long, 1997). In order 
to test whether there is a true contagion factor, we estimate a new dynamical model, 
where the appointment of a female director depends on the previous presence of women 
on the board. A true contagion effect implies that in those companies where there is a 
female director it is easier for a new woman to join the board.  
Since our sample includes data from the boards of the same companies in 2005 
and 2008, it is possible to compare the composition of both boards for each company, 
and at the same time to count the number of female and male directors leaving and 
joining the company’s board (see Table 3). 
The model specified is also a negative binomial model (Equations 1–2). The 
dependent variable in the new model is the number of female directors appointed by a 
company between 2005 and 2008 (yi) and the total number of directors appointed refers 
to the exposure variable (ni). As exogenous variables, we have included the proportion 
of women on the board in 2005, as well as the number of female directors that left the 
board in 2005. Farrell and Hersch (2005) use a similar framework, although with a 
Poisson model specification. Additionally, we include in the model the same variables 
considered in the previous sections for the gender composition of the board. Results of 
the model estimated are shown in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The results in Table 8 show that there is a positive relationship between the 
percentage of women already on the board and the likelihood of adding a woman to the 
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board between 2005 and 2008, which strongly indicates that a ‘true’ contagion effect 
exists, and this confirms hypothesis 4. This result is the opposite to that found by Farrell 
and Hersch (2005) for Fortune 500 companies, implying that companies in their sample 
tend to add women to their boards when they have low or no female representation, 
operating in a manner consistent with tokenism. By contrast, we find no evidence that if 
a female director leaves the board that gives rise to the probability of another female 
joining it, as would be expected if diversity were a goal of the firm. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3.2, in the static negative binomial models of Table 6, the 
risk, measured as the standard deviation of the ROA, helps to explain the different 
proportion of women directors. Given the sign of the estimated coefficient we can 
affirm that companies with greater uncertainty in their results are those in which it is 
less likely to have a woman as a director (see Table 7). This result is consistent with 
statistical discrimination in the sense proposed by Schubert et al. (1999). In this respect, 
if women are expected to be more conservative investors than men, they will be 
consequently excluded from those positions more related to risks. Nevertheless, this 
outcome is compatible with genuine higher female risk-aversion (Bernasek, 1998; 
Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sundén & Surette, 1998). 
Once again, we can rely on the dynamic negative binomial model approach to 
disentangle the two alternative explanations. In order to do this, we include in the model 
the risk variable moderated by the presence of women on the board as stated in 
Hypothesis 3.2 (we estimate two different coefficients for the risk variable, one for 
companies with women on the board and another for those without women). In the last 
model on Table 8, which includes this moderating term, we observe that the risk 
variable is significant when there are no women on the board, but not statistically 
significant when the company already includes women on the board. So, when there are 
women on the board, the risk level of the company has no effect on the gender of new 
directors, while for those companies without women, higher risk on income reduces the 
probability of hiring additional women. This result is in line with the statistical 
discrimination interpretation of Schubert et al. (1999), rather than with the actual risk 
aversion by female executives.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have disentangled the relative importance of the main factors 
explaining the scarce presence of women on the boards of directors of the top 1000 
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Spanish companies (6.61% in 2005 and 8.66% in 2008), that is, the reduced pool of 
female candidates, taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination. This is 
especially relevant since the first one would indicate a general problem for the society 
as the preferences and outlook on life that women have may be a consequence of the 
way they are brought up (and usually both firms and head-hunters specialized in board 
nominations that tend to explain the underrepresentation of women use this argument to 
explain it), the later ones indicates a problem of efficiency in the nomination process. 
This inefficiency is not just because having women necessarily have to improve 
business results in a direct and measurable way, but because the decision to exclude 
women of the process of recruiting new directors for the mere fact of being women is 
clearly inefficient (reduces the probability of choosing the best possible candidates for 
the company independently of their gender). 
In fact, the results of our model estimations indicate a positive and significant 
relationship between the proportion of female executives in the industry and the 
percentage of women on the board. This result supports the reduced pool of women 
candidates from executive positions as a cause for the under-representation of women 
on the Spanish boards of directors. This is also confirmed by the positive relationship 
between family-based companies and the proportion of women directors. We think this 
effect is caused by the tendency to favour family ties, regardless of gender, when it 
comes to promoting directors. In this way, as in family-based firms female executive 
candidates to the board are chosen among the owners-managers women family 
members the restriction of a reduced pool of women in the executive management does 
not apply. 
One of the important practical implications of these results is that if we want to 
raise the proportion of female directors it seems necessary to look for mechanisms to 
reduce the exclusion of women from the pool of potential candidates to join the board. 
On one hand, the reduced proportion of female candidates can only be resolved in the 
medium to long term with education and mentoring initiatives to improve their training 
for boards and management responsibility. Mentorship of young female managers by 
veteran CEO’s (Lee and Nolan, 1998) could help potential future directors to built self 
confidence, develop particular skills, learn about industry and increase personal impact. 
Another way to mitigate the socio-cultural obstacles women find in the early stages 
leading up to their professional promotion is the implementation of polices to achieve 
work/life balance and to share home duties more equally between men and women. A 
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possible solution to enlarge the reduced pool of female candidates is to expand the 
selection criteria to include other talent sources that are usually disregarded (such as 
human resources or customer relations managers, independent directors from liberal 
professionals, universities, research centres and non-profit organisations, in which 
women are highly represented). In the same sense, there is growing number of 
networking initiatives designed to help potential non-executives to enhance their 
credibility as candidates for board, and a growing number of non-commercial 
organisations developing databases of qualified women individuals interested in board 
positions.  
Nevertheless, in order to focus on customized measures that better improve the 
chances of a female executive reaching the board, it would be worth analyzing how her 
personal (social, familiar, economic) characteristics affect her professional 
development, including her subjective perception of positive/negative gender 
discrimination measures. 
Although the reduced pool of women candidates is a major cause, we find it 
quite improbable that the large gap existing between the scarce female representation on 
Spanish boards of directors and the approximately 32% of women’s participation in top 
executive positions can only be attributed only to differences in the labour supply. In 
fact, results related to the rest of the hypotheses we analyze in the paper confirms that 
the reduced pool of candidates is not the only argument. 
In this sense, there is evidence of taste-based discrimination. Moreover, we 
interpret the fact that older firms and more competitive sectors have a greater presence 
of female directors as a manifestation of the prediction from Becker’s theory of 
discrimination (Becker, 1957). In this respect, we can point out that both competition 
and time seem to be playing in favour of women’s presence on Spanish boards. Another 
relevant consequence of this finding is that the relationship of women directors and firm 
performance (that is out of the purpose of this paper) cannot be properly measured 
without controlling for this two factors that affect both the gender composition of the 
board and the results of the company and to the best of our knowledge no study has yet 
done it. 
Further research on this issue could give more evidence on the presence of 
discriminating practices. For instance, knowing the gender composition of a company’s 
management could help ascertain whether there is some discrimination bias in the 
nomination process by comparing this group with the actual board members. Event 
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studies could also be helpful. Analyzing the curriculum vitae of actual candidates to a 
board position and the candidate finally selected could help separate the relevance given 
to the personal skills of candidates from the role their gender plays in the final decision. 
Although data on failed candidates are difficult, if not impossible, to find, one exception 
is the case of Mergers and Acquisitions where the board of the resulting company is 
generally chosen from among the boards of the original companies and, therefore, we 
also know the names of the former directors that are excluded of the new board. 
Through the estimation of a negative binomial model, we also detect a contagion 
factor, according to which the presence of women on the board smoothes the way for 
other women joining the board. The results of the empirical model that analyses the 
likelihood of adding a female to the board strongly confirm that this is a true contagion 
rather than a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity in the sample (‘spurious 
contagion’).  
We interpret this contagious effect as evidence of the possible existence of a 
certain underestimation of women’s skills, based on the fact that the presence of women 
on the board contributes to reducing the bias in the perception of their abilities, since 
direct contact with people of the group discriminated against could reduce the effects of 
stereotypes and social prejudices (Bertrand, Dolly, & Mullainathan, 2005).  
Additional evidence of incorrect preconceptions about women attitudes and their 
capacity to hold these positions is found through a moderator effect of the presence of 
women on the risk variable. In this sense, although the lesser presence of women on the 
boards of riskier firms can be interpreted by using the explanation that women are 
usually more risk-averse than men (Bernasek, 1998; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; 
Sundén & Surette, 1998), we find that this negative effect disappears in the presence of 
women directors. The absence of a significant parameter of the interaction of women 
directors and risk support the theory of Schubert et al., (1999) since the prejudices 
concerning the female attitudes to risk would be eliminated or, at least, reduced, as the 
actual presence of female directors provides information on their real attitudes to risk. 
These evidences on inefficiencies in the nomination process does support public 
policy initiatives such as the implementation of those good corporate governance 
practices related to transparency and objectivity in selection procedures (i.e., 
preparation of training programmes for Incentive and Nomination Committees to select 
and evaluate candidates, objectiveness and precision in directors’ selection criteria, and 
request for public explanations from the board when women directors are few or 
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nonexistent). Even establishing quotas for women may be useful, since discrimination 
stemming from the underestimation of women’s skills can only be overcome by the 
presence of women on the boards that, in the medium-term, would provide more 
accurate information to banish biased evaluations on their capability regarding being 
appointed to boards of directors. 
In this connection, in recent years some public measures have attempted to 
tackle the problem of gender discrimination on Spanish boards. Since 2006, the CNMV 
has required all listed companies to inform in their Annual Report in compliance with 
the official recommendations concerning corporate governance recommendations 
concerning including their board functional structure, size and gender diversity issues. 
Similarly, the Equality Law of 2007 established this gender balance as one of their 
objectives. However, we are aware that companies, for the time being, have not reacted 
to any of these measures. Perhaps some time is required in both cases to fulfil their 
aims. In this sense, a continuous monitoring of the gender composition of the companies 
analyzed in this study could provide us in the near future with a powerful tool to assess 
the success of these initiatives. Comparative research with other countries that have 
established a similar quotas programme, such as Norway, could help gauge the 
effectiveness of these kinds of measures. 
Finally, we can conclude that although several theories explain the under-
representation of women in the top corporate world relying upon adverse selection or 
women’s incentive problems in the labour market, at least in the Spanish case the 
reduce pool of women executive candidates can not be claimed as the only and principal 
cause. On the contrary, there is a clear case of discrimination against women (taste base, 
statistical and mistake-based discrimination) that hinder their access to the board, and 
which requires active gender equality policies to reduce and remove it. The problem is 
much more complex and we have found evidence of several kinds of discrimination 
against women. This is something that academics, companies and policymakers should 
have in mind when trying to explain and cope with this problem. 
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1
 Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain honest answers to questions regarding unpleasant experiences like 
Have you suffered discrimination in your professional career? Besides, ‘suffered discrimination’ can 
have a different interpretation for each woman. 
2
 The term glass ceiling is thought to have first been used by two women at Hewlett-Packard in 1979, 
Katherine Lawrence and Marianne Schreiber, to describe how while on the surface there seemed to be a 
clear path of promotion, in fact women seemed to hit a point which they seemed unable to progress 
beyond. Later, the term was used in a March 1984 Adweek article by Gay Bryant Then the term glass 
ceiling became a permanent part of the American lexicon with a subsequent article in the Wall Street 
Journal published on 24 March 1986 by Carol Hymowitz and Timothy Schellhardt.  
3
 SABI (Analysis System of Iberian Balances) is a database that contains general and financial 
information about more than 800,000 Spanish companies. The information is obtained from distinct 
official sources, Mercantile Registries, BORME, newspapers, etc. and is updated periodically. SABI is 
distributed in Spain by Informa and Bureau Van Dijk. http://www.bvdep.com/SABI.html. 
4
 IZAR was eliminated since it was in the process of liquidation. EMYTEC Coop. Valenciana was 
eliminated since, according to the annual accounts of the Community of Valencia Cooperative Registry, 
its operating revenues in 2003 did not exceed 100 million euros. 
5
 An alternative way to obtain data about the composition of boards of directors is the use of surveys. 
However, survey data have low response rates that could drastically reduce the base of analysed 
companies. Furthermore, as Carter et al. (2003) suggest, survey data would likely be biased towards those 
firms wishing to ‘showcase’ their diverse boards.  
6
 For those companies with a sole administrator, they can be considered as a family-based firm when the 
family (at least two members) possesses a significant portion of the shares of the company, and when the 
function of Sole Administrator is held by one member of the family.  
7
 These six sectors are the following: Oil and energy; Commodities, industry and construction; Consumer 
goods; Consumer services; Financial services and real estate agencies; Technology and 
telecommunications.  
8
 We have also estimated Poisson, Zero-Inflated Poisson and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression 
Models. Nevertheless, using Likelihood Ratio Tests the Negative Binomial model is found to be superior 
to the Poisson model, while the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model is superior to the Zero-Inflated 
Poisson and Poisson models, but no significant difference is found relative to the simpler Negative 
Binomial Model. Results on these models would be provided by a request to the authors. 
9
 In order to check the consistency of the significance of the coefficients, we have estimated each model 
twice: first including all the independent variables; and a second one eliminating one-by-one all the non-
significant variables. In both cases we obtain the same significant variables, which can be considered as a 
robustness check for the significance of the coefficients against multicolinearity. Results on these models 
would be provided on request by the authors. 
10
 As a robust check of this later result and taking into account that 72 companies among our sample 
disappeared between 2005 and 2008, it is possible to estimate a probit/logit model on the probability of a 
company being closed down. Following Altman (1968), equity over debt, reserves over assets, working 
capital over assets, income over assets and return on assets are used as predictors of bankruptcy, as well 
as the number of women on the board, age of the company, industry dummies and other control variables. 
The result of this probit estimation reinforces our previous conclusions: younger companies and start-ups 
as well as a lower proportion of female directors have a higher proportion of default. 
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TABLE 1 
Previous research on women’s presence on the boards of directors of Spanish 
companies. 
Research Sample 
Women’s 
participation 
Boards 
without 
women 
Natividad (2002) 300 companies ranked by operating revenues 4.6% 76% 
Ethical Investment Research Services (2004) FTSE All World Developed Index (24 companies) 3.8% _ 
Félez, Romero, Pueyo, & Llaría (2004)  Ibex-35 (35 companies) 3.57% 63% 
European Professional Women’s Network (2004) 250 European companies by operating revenues 3% 60% 
Spencer Stuart (2004) 90 Spanish companies 4% 66% 
Albert-Roulhac (2005) Ibex-35 (35 companies) 2.6% 69% 
Gómez Ansón (2005) 119 Spanish listed companies 4.04% 68.07% 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of hypothesis tested, type of discriminations involved and related 
variables. 
 Proposition 1:  Proposition 2:  Proposition 3:  
Proposition 
The reduced pool of 
female executive 
candidates compared to 
men limits the number of 
women on the Board of 
Directors 
Lack of competition 
hinders the presence 
of women on the 
board 
Lack of information 
about actual personal 
abilities raises barriers 
against female 
candidates. 
Ultimate 
Cause 
Discrimination on the 
first stages of the 
professional career 
Adverse selection 
Taste-based 
discrimination 
Mistake-based, statistical 
discrimination 
Hypothesis 
H 1.1. There is a positive 
relationship between the 
industry proportion of 
female executives and 
the proportion of women 
on the board  
H. 1.2. Family-based 
firm variable has a 
positive relationship 
with the proportion of 
women directors.  
H 2.1. An industry’s 
concentration has a 
negative relationship 
with the percentage 
of women on the 
board. 
H 2.2. There is a 
positive relationship 
between a firm’s age 
and the proportion 
of women directors.  
H 3.1. The absence of 
women on the board has 
a negative relationship 
with the probability of 
hiring new female 
candidates 
H 3.2. The risk level of 
the firm has no effect on 
the gender of new 
directors when there are 
already women on the 
board  
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TABLE 3 
Boards of Directors 2005 and 2008. Descriptive statistics and flows of directors 
from 2005 to 2008. 
2005 2008 
Variable Sum Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Sum Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Number of board members  6525 6.01 4.59 1 57 5806 5.85 4.49 1 55 
Number of direct board members 6003 5.53 4.08 1 50 5277 5.32 3.98 1 47 
Number of female direct board members  397 0.37 0.82 0 6 457 0.46 0.95 0 10 
Number of male direct board members 5606 5.16 3.89 0 47 4820 4.86 3.66 0 42 
Boards without women 830 76.5 0.42 0 1 708 71.4 0.45 0 1 
Boards with one woman 174 16.0 0.37 0 1 185 18.6 0.39 0 1 
Boards with two women 44 4.1 0.20 0 1 59 5.9 0.24 0 1 
Boards with more than two women 37 3.4 0.18 0 1 40 4.0 0.20 0 1 
% of women among direct members  6.61 13.96 0 100   8.66 15.19 0 100 
 Sum Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Number of directors leaving the board 2005-2008 2619 2.29 2.52 0 18 
Number of directors entering the board 2005-2008 1893 1.65 2.12 0 16 
Number of male directors leaving the board 2005-2008 2483 2.16 2.41 0 18 
Number of male directors entering the board 2005-2008 1697 1.48 1.92 0 15 
Number of female directors leaving the board 2005-2008 136 0.12 0.44 0 5 
Number of female directors entering the board 2005-2008 196 0.17 0.52 0 6 
 
For the flows of directors we used a sub-sample of 992 companies: from the original sample of 1148 non-
financial companies, we have excluded those which were extinct in 2008 and those companies whose 
boards were entirely formed by institutional board members. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics 
 Total Family-based 
 2005 2008 2005 2008 
 n=1085 n=992 n=244 n=233 
 Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Total assets Th.€ (t-4,t-2) 683434 3460024 770893 3361705 400395 1010370 549554 1347437 
Return on Assets (t-4,t-2) 5.52 9.96 5.50 34.56 7.23 8.08 7.72 9.36 
St. Deviation Return on Assets (t-14,t-2) 6.70 14.24 6.72 19.01 4.97 5.02 4.56 4.07 
Indebtness Ratio (t-4,t-2) 0.70 0.25 0.71 0.40 0.65 0.21 0.63 0.20 
Productivity by Employee (t-4,t-2) 2803 18628 3368 16185 806 2058 1525 6935 
Firm Age 29.29 21.98 32.31 22.00 33.01 20.32 35.82 20.26 
 Listed Cooperative 
 2005 2008 2005 2008 
 n=58 n=59 n=15 n=16 
 Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Total assets Th.€ (t-4,t-2) 5335793 12800000 5531110 11800000 406328 859930 525313 1043272 
Return on Assets (t-4,t-2) 7.14 5.92 9.24 8.18 3.23 3.73 3.85 4.87 
St. Deviation Return on Assets (t-14,t-2) 4.45 4.58 4.10 3.29 1.92 1.68 1.67 1.21 
Indebtness Ratio (t-4,t-2) 0.62 0.15 0.61 0.18 0.65 0.10 0.66 0.12 
Productivity by Employee (t-4,t-2) 497 695 498 574 814 703 1001 804 
Firm Age (Log) 52.93 29.99 54.31 30.63 43.20 16.17 46.31 15.63 
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TABLE 5 
Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Number of direct members of the board 1   
2 Listed firm .44 1   
3 Cooperative .10 -.03 1   
4 Family-Based firm .01 .03 -.06 1   
5 Independence Indicator  .29 .47 .02 .15 1  
6 Firm Age (Log) .21 .22 .09 .13 .17 1  
7 Total assets Th.€ (t-4.t-2) (Log) .39 .41 -.01 -.03 .20 .20 1  
8 Return on Assets (t-4.t-2) .07 .05 -.03 .07 .03 .17 .04 1  
9 St. Deviation Return on Assets (t-14.t-2)(Log) -.16 -.07 -.15 -.09 -.15 -.02 -.12 .12 1  
10 Indebtness ratio (t-4.t-2) -.08 -.06 -.02 -.10 -.08 -.16 -.10 -.43 .02 1 
11 Productivity by employee (t-4.t-2) (Log) -.10 -.13 .01 -.14 -.06 -.22 -.09 -.01 -.03 .12 1
12 Proportion of women executives in industry .06 .07 -.03 .03 -.02 -.00 -.04 .06 .05 -.08 .02 1
13 HHI (Log) -.03 -.05 -.01 -.14 .02 -.08 .12 .03 .08 -.04 .07 -.08 1
14 Public contracts over income (2004-2006) (%) -.03 -.01 -.02 .04 -.02 .05 .05 -.01 -.02 .04 -.10 -.07 -.15 1
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TABLE 6 
Negative binomial regression models on the number of women on the board (with 
exposure to the number of direct members of the board) 
Pooled Data 
(2005-2008) 
Panel Data 
(2005-2008) 
  
Model I Model II 
Constant -2.89  -3.19  
Number of direct members of the board 0.05 ** 0.05 * 
Number of direct members of the board (squared) -0.01 ** -0.00  
Listed firm -0.59 * -0.28  
Cooperative 1.99 *** 1.15 ** 
Family-Based firm 1.35 *** 0.98 *** 
Independence Indicator  -0.12 * -0.08 * 
Firm Age (Log) 0.20 * 0.22 * 
Total assets Th.€ (t-4,t-2) (Log) -0.06 † -0.07  
Return on Assets (t-4,t-2) -0.00  -0.00  
St. Deviation Return on Assets (t-14,t-2)(Log) -0.12 ** -0.10 † 
Indebtness ratio (t-4,t-2) -0.01  0.11  
Productivity by employee (t-4,t-2) (Log) -0.02  0.01  
HHI (Log) -0.10 * -0.10 † 
Proportion of women executives in industry 0.90 * 1.12 * 
Public contracts over income (2004-2006) 
(%)*Year 2008 
-0.00  -0.00  
Year 2008 0.37 *** 0.26 *** 
Industry effects Yes  Yes  
Company random effects No  Yes  
Contagion effect (α) 0.45 *** 1.28 *** 
Number of observations 1730  1730  
LR test 204.01 *** 120.77 *** 
Wald test 254.85 *** 121.45 *** 
LR test against a Poisson 38.87 *** 204.17 *** 
LR test against a Zero-Infl. Negative Binomial 2.65  0.25  
Estimations obtained with STATA v.9. A robust variance-covariance matrix is used in order to correct 
heteroscedasticity and correlation among directors of the same board. 
For each variable, an LR test has been performed between a model with and without this variable. 
Stars give the significant level of the null hypothesis rejection: 0.1% ***, 1% **, 5% * and 10% †.  
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FIGURE 1  
Probability of a board position being held by a woman.  
Influence of Board Size (upper left-hand side), Firm age (upper right-hand side), Proportion of female 
executives in the industry (lower left-hand side), Industrial Concentration Index (lower right-
hand side) 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
0 5 10 15 20 25
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f f
e
m
a
le
 
di
re
c
to
rs
Board Size
Panel Data Pooled Data
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f f
e
m
a
le
 
di
re
c
to
rs
Firm Age
Panel Data Pooled Data
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f f
e
m
a
le
 
di
re
c
to
rs
Proportion of Female Executives in the Industry
Panel Data Pooled Data
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f f
e
m
a
le
 
di
re
c
to
rs
HHI. Industry Concentration Index
Panel Data Pooled Data
 
 
Probabilities computed for the models in Table 4 (models I and II). A representative company in 2008 has 
been considered to be a non-family-based one, that is not listed and not a cooperative, with an 
independence indicator equal to C, mean risk and assets, 24 years old, and belonging to the category of 
Consumer Services, with the mean proportion of female executives and sales concentration and with five 
direct members of the board (mean and mode of each quantitative and qualitative variable respectively). 
All variables are fixed to the base case and moving each variable one by one. 
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TABLE 7 
Probability of a board position being held by a woman. Marginal effects of 
independent variables. 
  Panel Data Pooled Data    Panel Data Pooled Data 
St. dev. ROA (Log)    Family-based companies   
µ−2σ 7.90% 8.70%  No 6.53% 6.97% 
µ−σ 7.14% 7.74%  Yes 17.28% 17.24% 
µ 6.48% 6.90%  Cooperative   
µ+σ 5.88% 6.13%  No 6.53% 6.97% 
µ+2σ 5.33% 5.45%  Yes 20.48% 20.72% 
Total Assets. Th. Eur. (Log)    Year   
µ−2σ 8.06% 8.46%  2005 6.27% 6.28% 
µ−σ 7.28% 7.70%  2008 8.05% 8.66% 
µ 6.57% 7.00%  Listed   
µ+σ 5.94% 6.36%  No 6.58% 6.97% 
µ+2σ 5.73% 6.16%  Yes 5.11% 4.83% 
Industrial sector    Independence indicator    
Financial services and real estate agencies 8.15% 9.69%  A+ 4.36% 4.64% 
Oil and energy 7.14% 7.91%  A 4.73% 5.03% 
Consumer services 6.53% 6.97%  A- 5.13% 5.45% 
Consumer goods 6.24% 7.06%  B+ 5.56% 5.90% 
Commodities, industry and construction 4.18% 4.92%  B- 6.03% 6.41% 
Technology and telecommunications 4.33% 4.05%  C 6.53% 6.97% 
 
Probabilities computed for the models in Table 4 (models I and II). A representative company in 2008 has 
been considered to be a non-family-based one, that is not listed and not a cooperative, with an 
independence indicator equal to C, mean risk and assets, 24 years old, and belonging to the category of 
Consumer Services, with the mean proportion of female executives and sales concentration and with five 
direct members of the board (mean and mode of each quantitative and qualitative variable respectively). 
All variables are fixed to the base case and moving each variable one by one. 
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TABLE 8 
Negative binomial models for the number of women entering the board from 2005 
to 2008  
 Negative Binominal 
 Model III  Model IV Model V 
Variables (All Variables)  (Only Significant) (Only Significant) 
Constant -2.08   -1.88  -1.76 
% women among direct members in 2005 1.58 *  2.25 ** 1.82** 
Number of female departures -0.00      
Number of direct members of the board 0.01      
Listed firm -0.05      
Family-based firm 0.27      
Independence indicator -0.03      
Cooperative 1.29 *     
Firm size -0.02      
Return on assets (2001–2003) (%) 0.02      
St. deviation return on assets (1991–2003) (Log) -0.07   -0.11 *  
St. deviation (Companies with female directors in 2005)      -0.05 
St. deviation (Companies without female directors in 2005)      -0.21* 
Productivity by employee (2001–2003) (Log) -0.02      
Indebtedness ratio (2001–2003) 0.32      
Firm age (Log) -0.08      
Public contracts over income (2004–2006) (%) -0.85      
Industry effects YES   YES  YES 
α (contagion effect) 0.04   0.03  0.03 
LR test  33.95 *  39.18 ** 43.60** 
Wald test  61.69 **  46.96 ** 44.20** 
 
Models include an exposure factor of total directors entering the board between 2005 and 2008 
Estimations obtained with STATA v.9. A robust variance-covariance matrix is used in order to correct 
heteroscedasticity and correlation among directors of the same board. 
For each variable, an LR test has been performed between a model with and without this variable. 
Stars give the significant level of the null hypothesis rejection: 0.1% ***, 1% **, 5% * and 10% †. 
 
Page 42 of 42
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
